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Staking Out the Border Between Commandeering
and Conditional Preemption: Is the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act Constitutional
Under the Tenth Amendment?
Rachel F. Preiser*

INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994
("DPPA") in response to state sales of personal information contained
in motor vehicle records to individuals and to direct marketing com
panies who use it to identify select groups of prospective customers for
particular products.1 Thirty-four states sell their department of motor
vehicles ("DMV") records to individual citizens and to direct market
ers, essentially allowing their unregulated distribution to any party
seeking them.2 This practice of selling and distributing personal in
formation has serious implications for the privacy and safety of indi
vidual citizens.3
In considering the DPPA, Congress dwelt in particular on the use
of DMV information by murderers, robbers, and stalkers to identify
their victims.4 In California, a man who had hired a private detective
to obtain the address of actress Rebecca Shaeffer from the state
department of motor vehicles brutally murdered her in the doorway of
her Los Angeles apartment.5 Another California resident copied
* Thanks to Professors Donald Regan and Roderick Hills for their last-minute com
ments and critique. I take full responsibility for the content of this piece.

1. Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA ") of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A.§§ 2721-2725 ( West
Supp. 1998). Personal information collected by state motor vehicle departments {DMVs)
includes names, addresses, and social security numbers of registered drivers.
2 See 139 CONG. REC. 29,469 (1993) (statement of Sen. Robb); see also Michael W.
Miller, Firms Peddle Information from Driver's Licenses, WALL ST. J., Nov.25, 1991, at Bl.
According to Miller, "[m]ost drivers who register for a license have no idea their personal
information finds its way into the hands of marketers." In a 1993 article for the Boston
Globe, Larry Tye described our information age as "a time when invisible list-makers have
replaced door-to-door salesmen ...and marketers swap the details of our private lives like
baseball cards. " See Larry Tye, No Private Lives: List-makers Draw a Bead on Many,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.6, 1993, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File.

3. See Protecting Driver Privacy: Legislative Hearing on H.R. 3365 Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 322

(1994) (statement of Dr. Mary J. Culnan, Associate Professor, School of Business,
Georgetown University).
4. See 139 CONG. REC. 29,467 (1993) (statement of Sen.Hatch).
5.

See id. at 29,466 (statement of Sen.Boxer).
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down the license plate numbers of five young women and sent them
threatening letters after obtaining their home addresses from the
California DMV.6 Anti-abortion groups have long used license plate
numbers of cars parked in front of abortion clinics to track down and
harass women seeking abortions by obtaining their addresses from
DMV records.7
The abandon with which DMVs sell the complete contents of their
records on registered drivers to national marketing companies is
equally disconcerting. These national marketers specialize in identi
fying the overweight, divorced, wealthy, or short in stature in order to
assist enterprises eager to target the consumer base most responsive to
their form of solicitation.8 Because the compilation, analysis, and dis
tribution of such information is in fact an important national industry,
accounting for five percent of U.S. employment and $350 billion in
annual revenue,9 the regulation of that industry is an area of immedi
ate national concem.10
The DPPA regulates the distribution of DMV personal informa
tion by placing a prohibition both on state and individual activities.
First, the Act prohibits states from freely releasing personal informa
tion from state DMV records.11 It then enumerates the conditions un
der which states may continue to distribute DMV information
if
they choose not to abandon the field to federal control - and limits
-

6. See id.
7. See id. at 29,469 (statement of Sen. Robb).
8. See Miller, supra note 2.
9. See Tye, supra note 2. In describing the burgeoning direct marketing industry, Tye
notes:
[A]s marketing in America becomes more and more targeted, more and more people are
wondering whether it's an unacceptable invasion of privacy ... [a]nd whether the old system
of self-regulation makes sense for a direct marketing industry that, according to a [Direct
Marketing Association]-sponsored analysis of everything from advertising to computer
services, accounts for 5 percent of US employment and $350 billion in anntiill revenues.

Id.

10. Editor and author Anne Fadiman recently commented on the mass marketing del
uge of the information age in Ex Libris: Confessions of a Common Reader. Ms. Fadiman
notes, in her chapter entitled "The Catalogical Imperative":
I have never actually solicited a catalogue. Although it is tempting to conclude that our
mailbox hatches them by spontaneous generation, I know they are really the offspring of
promiscuous mailing lists, which copulate in secret and for money. One of the ...horrors of
the direct mail business is that you never know to whom your name will be pandered.
ANNE FADIMAN, Ex LIBRIS:

CONFESSIONS OF A COMMON READER 114 {1998); see also
infra Part I for a discussion of the constitutionality of federal regulation of the distribution of
DMV records under the Commerce Clause.

11. Part (a) of the statute provides: "[A] State department of motor vehicles, and any
officer, employee, or contractor, thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or ofuerwise make
available to any person or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the
department in connection wifu a motor vehicle record. " Driver's Privacy Protection Act of
1994, 18 U.S.C.A. § 272l{a) (West Supp. 1998).
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the redistribution of that information by authorized individuals who
obtain it from the DMV.12 The state may opt out of the regulatory
scheme entirely by placing a notice on all of its official forms indicat
ing that personal information collected may be freely disclosed and
providing the opportunity for any registrant to prohibit such disclo
sure.13
Three of the four district courts that have considered challenges to
the DPPA have held the law unconstitutional, although two of those

12. The permissible uses are enumerated in part {b) of section 2721 as follows:
{l) For use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in
carrying out its functions
(2) For use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft
(3) For use in the normal course of business by a legitimate business or its agents, employ
ees, or contractors, but only(A) to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the individual ... and
(B) if such information as so submitted is not correct or is no longer correct, to obtain the
correct information, but only for the purposes of preventing fraud by, pursuing legal
remedies against, or recovering on a debt or security interest against, the individual.
(4) For use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding
(5) For use in research activities, and for use in producing statistical reports, so long as the
personal information is not published, redisclosed, or used to contact individuals.
(6) For use by any insurer or insurance support organization
(7) For use in providing notice to the owners of towed or impounded vehicles.
(8) For use by any licensed private investigative agency or licensed security service for any
purpose permitted under this subsection.
(9) For use by an employer
to obtain or verify information relating to a holder of a com·
mercial driver's license
(10) For use in connection with the operation of private toll transportation facilities.
(11) For any other use in response to requests for individual motor vehicle records if the mo·
tor vehicle department has provided in a clear and conspicuous manner on [itsJ forms
no·
tice that personal information
may be disclosed to any business or person, and has pro·
vided in a clear and conspicuous manner on such forms an opportunity to prohibit such
disclosures.
(12) For bulk distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations if the motor vehicle de
partment has implemented methods and procedures to ensure thatindividuals are provided an opportunity, in a clear and conspicuous manner, to prohibit
such uses
(13) For use by any requester, if the requester demonstrates it has obtained the written con·
sent of the individual to whom the information pertains.
(14) For any other use specifically authorized under the law of the State that holds the rec·
ord, if such use is related to the operation of a motor vehicle or public safety.
18 U.S.C. §2721(b.). The law goes on to limit the resale or redisclosure of personal informa·
tion obtained from DMV records by "authorized recipients " as follows:
An authorized recipient of personal information
may resell or redisclose the information
only for a use permitted under subsection (b) (but not for uses under subsection (b)(ll) or
(12))
Any authorized recipient (except a recipient under subsection (b)(ll)) that resells
or rediscloses personal information covered by this title must keep for a period of 5 years re
cords identifying each person or entity that receives information and the permitted purpose
for which the information will be used and must make such records available to the motor
vehicle department upon request.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(c).
. . • .

• • • •

• • • •

. • • •

• . •

• . • •

. • •

• . .

• . . •

• . •

. . • •

13. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 272l(b){ll) (quoted supra note 12).
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three were reversed on appeal.14 At both the district and appellate
court levels, dispute over the Act focuses not on whether it falls within
Congress's Article I commerce power, but rather on the question of
whether the Act impermissibly regulates the states in violation of the
limitations on federal power imposed by the Tenth Amendment.15 Al
though the Supreme Court has established that the two inquiries are,
in theory, two sides of the same coin,16 courts have often treated them
independently.17
The first inquiry deserves more serious attention than courts
evaluating the DPPA have given it. Under modem Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, which posits relatedness to the interstate exchange of
goods and services as the touchstone for the federal commerce
power,18 the DPPA seems a valid exercise of congressional authority.
Under a more functional, less formalistic view of the Commerce
Clause proposed by Professor Donald Regan, the question of whether
the DPPA passes muster is less clear-cut. This view of the Commerce
Clause extends federal power only to areas of concern to the nation as
a nation, that the states are not competent to regulate independently.19
The DPPA may address such an issue. The second inquiry, like the
first, is concerned with whether the federal government is using the
14. See Pryor v. Reno, 998F. Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding the DPPA constitu
tional), rev'd, 171F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999); Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921 (W.D. Wis.
1998) (holding the DPPA unconstitutional), rev'd, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998); Oklahoma
ex rel Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 994 F. Supp. 1358 (W.D. Okla. 1997)
(holding the DPPA unconstitutional), rev'd, 161F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998); Condon v. Reno,
972F. Supp. 977 (D.S.C. 1997) (holding the DPPA unconstitutional), aff'd, 155 F.3d 453 (4th
Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999).
15. See, e.g., Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 982-86 (holding the DPPA unconstitutional as a
violation of the Tenth Amendment and finding that the statute cannot be justified as an ex
ercise of the commerce power).
16. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in New York v. United States, asserted
that these two questions - the extent of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and
the extent of the domain of sovereignty reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment
- "are mirror images of each other." 505 U. S. 144, 156 (1992).
17. See, e.g., New York, 505 U. S. at 160. The New York Court struck down a provision
of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act requiring states either to regulate �aste dis
posal according to federal standards or to take title to radioactive waste produced within
their borders. Although the regulation of radioactive waste disposal at issue in New York
clearly fell within Congress's interstate commerce power, the Court struck down the "take
title" provision of the Act on Tenth Amendment grounds.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free
School Zone Act is not within the federal commerce power because it is too remote from
commerce both in character and purpose).
19. See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Inci
dentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 580-81 (1995) (arguing that
the only viable alternative to the accretion of unworkable formalisms within Commerce

Clause jurisprudence is an approach that focuses on whether a federal law enacted under the
commerce power in fact seeks to achieve a national interest that could not be achieved by
the separate states).
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states to accomplish a federal objective that is beyond its enumerated
powers. In pursuing this Tenth Amendment inquiry, however, the
Court has been primarily concerned with the mode of regulation
rather than whether a federal law regulates an appropriate domain.
The Court in New York v. United States struck down the "take-title"
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act on the
grounds that it "commandeered" state legislatures to develop a feder
ally prescribed regulatory program, while recognizing that the domain
of regulation was within federal power.20 The Court expanded on this
anti-commandeering rule in Printz v. United States, holding that the
federal government could not circumvent the rule simply by com
manding state officers rather than the state itself.21 The Court found
that laws that commandeer the states violate the Tenth Amendment
and fundamental federalist principles by allowing the federal govern
ment to operate indirectly through the states, thereby avoiding finan
cial and political responsibility for federal policies.22
The two circuit courts that have held the DPPA unconstitutional
found that the burden of compliance upon states violates the anti
commandeering precedent laid down by New York and Printz.13 In
holding the DPPA unconstitutional, these courts state that the DPPA
conscripts state officers into federal service by requiring them to be
come familiar with and implement new standards for the release of
DMV information.24 One district court has also based its decision to
enjoin the law's application on the burdensome fines it imposes on
noncompliant states.25

20.

See New York, 505 U.S. at 161.

21. 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (holding that a provision of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act requiring state officials to conduct background checks on all prospective gun
purchasers impennissibly commandeered state officers to administer and enforce a federal
regulatory scheme). The Printz Court stated that "where, as here, it is the whole object of
the law to direct the fµnctioning of the state executive," the law violates the Tenth A mend
ment protection of state sovereignty against federal incursion. Id.
22

See New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69. The New York Court noted:

[W]here the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who
will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regula
tory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decisions. Ac
countabi lity is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot
regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by
federal regulation.
ld at 169.

23. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453
(4th Cir.1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999).
24. See Pryor, 171 F.3d at 1286; Condon, 155 F3d at 456-57 (quoting the district court
decision, Condon v. Reno, 972 F.Supp. 977, 979-81 (D.S.C.1997)).

25. See Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 994 F.Supp.
1358, 1364 (W.D.Okla. 1997), rev'd, 161 F3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998).
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In contrast, the district court in Pryor v. Reno and several appellate
courts have upheld the DPPA26 by relying on earlier Supreme Court
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, often referred to as the Garcia line
of cases.27 In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
the Court held that the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act should be applied to state, as well as private,
employers.28 In so doing, Garcia rejected the prohibition on federal
regulation of states as states in domains of traditional state function
that had been established by National League of Cities v. Usery.29 The
courts that have upheld the DPPA, relying on the Garcia line of cases,
rest their decisions on the distinction between federal laws that com
mandeer the states and federal laws that simply require state compli
ance in order to take effect.
The New York and Printz decisions are in some tension with the
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence that immediately followed Garcia,30
because they rely to some extent on pre-Garcia formalisms regarding
dual sovereignty.31 The split between the courts on the constitutional
ity of the DPPA testifies to this tension, for the disagreement turns on
the question of which of the two competing lines of precedent should
control.32 While acknowledging the tension in Tenth Amendment ju-

26. See Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1998), rev'd, 171F.3d 1281 (11th
Cir. 1999); Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998); Oklahoma, �rel. Oklahoma Dep't
of Pub. Safety, 161F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998).
27. The Garcia line of cases is generally taken to include cases which preceded Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), including EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), and Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. 452 U.S. 264 (1981), as well as some
which followed in the course it charted, such as South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
28. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
29. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (establishing a three-part
test that finds a violation of state sovereignty where a federal law (1) regulates states as
states (2) in an area of traditional state sovereignty (3) so as to directly impair the states'
ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions).
30. This Note refers to the cases immediately following Garcia
such as South
as "the Garcia line," although Garcia may be seen as clearing the way
not only for these cases but also for the competing line of precedent embodied in New York
and Printz.
Carolina v. Baker

-

-

31. Because the anachronistic langnage of sovereignty pervades the New York and
Printz Courts' Tenth Amendment analysis, it is at times difficult to recognize that the
Courts' decisions in both cases are preoccupied not with a delineation of discrete realms of
absolute power of federal and state governments but rather with identifying unconstitutional
modes in which the federal government has sought to exercise otherwise viable regulatory
control.

32. Compare, e.g., Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 984 (D.S.C. 1997) ("The court
agrees with Defendants' characterization of the DPPA and finds that the DPPA is not the
type [of] federal legislation prohibited by New York and Printz. Rather, the court finds that
the DPPA is analogous to the statute found constitutional in South Carolina v. Baker.")
("The State asserts, and the Court agrees, that the DPPA falls within the prohibition of New
York and Printz."), affd, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999)
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risprudence following Garcia, courts have recently reaffirmed that the
Garcia line remains good law.33
Confusion over the relationship between the Garcia and New
York-Printz lines of cases is a central feature of the disagreement over
the constitutionality of the DPPA. The New York Court characterizes
the laws at issue in the Garcia line of cases - laws the Court describes
as "generally applicable," because they subject states to the same leg
islation applicable to private parties - as posing no problem for its
anti-commandeering principle.34 In addition, the New York and Printz
Courts acknowledge that federal laws that preempt state regulation, or
conditionally preempt it by allowing states to choose between preemp
tion and implementation of federal regulations, also escape the prob
lems posed by commandeering.35 The Courts stop short, however, of
explicitly recognizing that laws of general applicability usually operate
in a preemptive mode.36 This Note draws the connection between
generally applicable laws and the mode of conditional preemption, ar
guing that both are constitutionally unproblematic because they tend
to preserve the fundamental federalist principle of political account
ability. By providing a unifying federalist explanation for the privi
leged place given to laws of general applicability and conditional pre
emption, this Note lends coherence to the strands of Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence.
This Note argues for the constitutionality of the DPPA, first en
gaging the threshold question of whether the law falls within the fed
eral commerce power and then considering whether its legislative
mode is permissible in light of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Part
I argues that the DPPA is properly within the reach of Congress's
commerce power. Part II lays the groundwork for the Tenth Amend
ment examination of the DPPA's legislative mode, by establishing the
relation of general applicability to commandeering and preemption in

with Pryor v.Reno, 998 F. Supp.1317, 1329 (M.D. Ala. 1998), rev'd, 171F.3d 1281 (11th Cir.

1999).

33. See West v. Anne Arundel County, 137 F. 3d 752 (4th Cir. 1998). In West, the
Fourth Circuit reconsidered the constitutionality of those provisions of theFair Labor Stan
dards Act (the same law under attack in Garcia) that apply specifically to state employers.
While acknowledging that Printz stressed the importance of the Tenth Amendment's limita
tion of federal power, the court nevertheless relied on Garcia to uphold the challenged pro
visions, stating that "neither Printz nor any other Supreme Court case has specifically over
ruled Garcia." Id. at 760.
34. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160-61 (1992).
35. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997); New York, 505 U.S.at 167.
36. Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 921

(1998) (asserting that "[i]t is true as a matter of fact that most generally applicable laws
be defended as conditional preemption of what legislators regard as a socially costly ac
tivity").

can

•

•

•
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a federalism context. Part ill argues that the DPP A takes the form of
conditional preemption rather than impermissible commandeering;
hence, it should survive the second part of the constitutional analysis.
I.

EVALUATING THE DPPA A S AN EXERCISE OF FEDERAL
PREEMPTION UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAU SE

Congress's longstanding power to preempt state law within a field
subject to national control is not subject to dispute.37 The preemptive
mode of federal infringement on the states' exercise of power must,
however, be limited to areas in which the Constitution explicitly grants
federal control. 38 Otherwise, the national government would cease to
be a government of enumerated powers.
An assessment of whether the DPPA is constitutional relies on the
determination of whether the national sale of state DMV information
falls within the federal government's enumerated powers, specifically
the commerce power. Section I.A demonstrates that the DPPA falls
within the formalistic definition of the commerce power presented by
recent Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence as embodied
in United States v. Lopez. 39 Section I.B offers a more functional ap
proach to defining the limits of the commerce power and argues that
the DPPA may also pass muster under this analysis.
A

Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: Does the DPPA Fall Within the
Federal Commerce Power?

To determine the constitutionality of the DPPA, one must answer
the threshold question of whether it regulates a domain that falls
within Congress's commerce power as enumerated in Article I, Sec
tion 8.40 This threshold determination is a necessary prerequisite to
justifying the mode of conditional preemption that the law takes.41
Historically, the Court has tended towards a kind of Commerce
Clause analysis that looks only for characteristics of commerce with37. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767,
767 {1994). According to Gardbaum, the federal power of preemption was first clearly ar
ticulated by the Court in New York Central Railroad v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147 {1917). See
Gardbaum, supra, at 815 n.65.
38. See Gardbaum, supra note 37, at 770. Gardbaum states that the "issueO of . . . pre
emption arise[s] only where the states and the federal government have concurrent power,"
implying that there can be no legitimate exercise of federal preemption in a given area of
regulation unless the area falls within the federal government's control as well as that of the
states.
39. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 {1995).
40. See U.S. CONST. art.I, § 8, cl. 3.

41. See Gardbaum, supra note 37, at 770; see also supra text accompanying note 39; New
York v.United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1992).
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out considering the overarching purpose of a law or whether federal
intervention is necessary to accomplish that purpose.42 That analysis
has alternately produced excessively narrow and overbroad versions
of the federal commerce power.43 The latter interpretation is exempli
fied in the Supreme Court's 1941 decision in United States v. Darby.44
In Darby, the Court held that Congress had power to prohibit the in
terstate shipment of lumber manufactured by employees whose
working conditions violated the Fair Labor Standards Act because the
commerce power "extends to those activities intrastate which so affect
interstate commerce ... as to make regulation of them appropriate."45
In contrast, several cases of the same period employed commerce
fetishizing formalisms to restrict the scope of the Commerce Clause,
either by excluding manufacturing from federal regulation as not
comprehended in "commerce,"46 or by excluding from federal control
activities that have only an indirect influence on commerce between
the States.47 For more than half a century before Lopez, however, the
trend had been towards an expansive view of the scope of the federal
commerce power.48
Although the Court attempted to narrow the potential expansive
ness of its approach by striking down the Gun-Free School Zone Act
in Lopez, it relied on formalisms that have periodically plagued its ap
plication of the Commerce Clause.49 Hence, the Court held that an act
prohibiting possession of a gun within 500 feet of a school zone over
reached the federal government's commerce power, because the law's

42. See Regan, supra note 19, at 560-562.
43. See Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid
Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1995).
44. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117-24 (1941) (holding that the Co=erce
Clause was not limited to the regulation of co=erce among the states but extended to
regulation of intrastate activities that so influenced interstate co=erce as to warrant fed
eral regulation); see also Regan, supra note 19, at 560 nn.19-21 and accompanying text.

45. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118.
46. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that the co=erce
power did not authorize the regulation of bituminous coal production because production
precedes co=erce); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that fed
eral antitrust laws did not reach a conspiracy among sugar producers because manufacture is
not co=erce).
47. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding
that a federal law setting minimum wage and maximum hours for slaughterhouse workers
went beyond the government's co=erce power because the regulation had only an "indi
rect'' effect on interstate co=erce).
48. See McJohn, supra note 43, at 1.

49. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("As
the Chief Justice explains . . . neither the actors nor their conduct has a co=ercial charac
ter, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute has an evident co=ercial
nexus."); cf. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 550; E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 16.
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effect on and relatedness to "interstate commerce" were too remote to
fall within the reach of the Commerce Clause.50
The Court's analysis in Lopez nevertheless expresses the current
state of the inquiry into the scope of the commerce power. Under this
analysis the DPPA clearly passes muster, since it regulates a national
market in information, involving the movement of DMV records con
taining personal information on all of a state's licensed drivers across
state lines.51 Because the distribution of DMV records is an interstate
activity that enables the national exchange of personal information,
the Commerce Clause empowers the federal government to regulate
that activity.
B.

Is the DPPA Valid Under a Functional Approach to the
Commerce Clause?

Not only does the DPPA fall within the Commerce Clause ac
cording to the formalistic analysis used in Lopez, but it also satisfies
the more comprehensive requirements of a functional approach. Be
cause the Lopez Court limited its inquiry to indicators of "interstate
commerce" and failed to consider whether the purpose of the federal
law was a nationally important one that could not be competently
achieved by independent state regulation, it failed to provide a solid
analytical framework for Commerce Clause doctrine.52 By focusing
commerce clause analysis on the degree of relatedness of a regulated
activity to the movement of goods, data, or people across state lines,

50. See Lopez, 514 U. S. at 551 ("The Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor
contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate com
merce. ").
51. A "good " that both moves in interstate commerce and is essential to facilitating in
terstate commerce - like the personal information from DMV records sold to mass market
ers nationwide and used by them to reach national consumers - would be an "instrumen
tality" of interstate commerce and hence within the federal commerce power. See Lopez,
514 U.S. at 558-59 ("First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate com
merce. ... Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat
may come only from intrastate activities.. . . Finally, Congress' commerce authorityincludes
the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce,
i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. " (citations omitted)).
52 See Lopez, 514 U. S. at 567 ("The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no
sense an economic activity that might . . . substantially affect any sort of interstate com
merce. .. . [T]here is no indication that [Respondent] had recently moved in interstate com
merce, and there is no requirement [in the Act] that his possession of the firearm have any
concrete tie to interstate commerce. "); see also Regan, supra note 19, at 555 (noting that,
although the outcome of Lopez is probably correct, the Court's analysis is "unsatisfactory ").
The formalistic quality of the Lopez Court's analytical framework is exposed by the
amendment to the Gun-Free School Zone Act made following the Lopez decision in order
to render the Jaw constitutional within the Lopez guidelines. The law was amended to pro
hibit the possession within 500 feet of a school zone of any gun that has traveled in interstate
commerce. See 18 U. S. C. A. § 922(q)(2)( A) (West Supp. 1999).
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the Court ignored the constitutionally significant question of whether
a law has a nationally important purpose requiring federal implemen
tation.s3
A more substantive, functional analysis, advocated in the work of
Professor Regan, would take account of the particular institutional
structure of our government to address the question of whether a uni
form federal regulation is necessary to effect a purpose of genuine na
tional interest.54 The Commerce Clause grants the federal government
legislative power to pursue such an interest, important to the nation as
a nation and which the states are separately incompetent, or not moti
vated, to achieve.ss If a domain proves to be within the federal com
merce power so understood, then it is by definition suited to the legis
lative mode of preemption.
The DPPA, in regulating the distribution of personal information
by state DMVs to mass marketers and others, implicates interstate
communication and transportation, issues of genuine national inter
est.s6 Applying Regan's definition of national interest as an interest
that concerns the nation as a nation, the best argument in support of
restricting distribution of DMV information in the national interest is
that such restrictions reduce the potential danger associated with ob
taining a license.s7 Reducing this danger decreases a burden placed
upon interstate travel; individuals will not be forced to choose be
tween securing their personal information and obtaining a license.
53. See Regan, supra note 19, at 570-71.
54. See id. at 569, 571 (arguing that federal regulation is not appropriate to address the
problem of gun possession near schools at issue in Lopez because "[t]here is nothing in the
background of the [Gun-Free School Zones Act] to suggest that states are less capable of
dealing with the problem ...than the federal government; nor is there anything to suggest
the states are inadequately motivated to do so ").
55. See id. at 570-71. Regan supports his reading of the Commerce Clause with the lan
guage of the sixth Virginia Resolution, approved by the Constitutional Convention on July
17, 1787. The resolution stated "[t]hat the national legislature ought to possess the legisla
tive rights vested in Congress by the confederation; and moreover, to legislate in all cases for
the general interests of the union, and also in those to which the States are separately in
competent, or in which harmony of the United states may be interrupted by the exercise of
individual legislation." NOTES ON DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 380 (W.W.Norton & Co.ed., 1966).
56. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text; see also Regan, supra note 19, at 57173. Regan recognizes "transportation and communication " as "general interests of the un
ion." Id. at 571.
57. According to Regan, a "genuine interest of the nation " is more than merely an in
terest that concerns all states in the nation. Rather, it is an interest that particularly impli
cates the national identity and the states' ability to operate as a nation. The assessment of
what constitutes a genuine national interest is in the first instance for Congress to make, not
the courts. See Regan, supra note 19, at 567-73, 579-81. Although Congress has raised safety
concerns regarding the distribution of DMV information, see supra text accompanying notes
4-7, it has not explicitly identified that threat as a threat to national transportation, and thus,
_Regan would not necessarily identify the regulation of DMV information as a genuine na
tional interest.
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The second question in determining whether the domain of DMV
information distribution falls within the commerce power is whether
the federal government is in fact more competent or more motivated
than the separate states to protect the national interest effectively. On
the one hand, pressure from a state's citizens concerned with privacy
and safety may be a powerful motivating factor that would encourage
the states, independently, to take the necessary measures to limit the
distribution of the citizens' personal information. Certainly the re
sources necessary for regulation of the distribution of DMV informa
tion are as readily available to states as to the federal government.
While both are competent to regulate, however, the states, unlike the
federal government, are faced with the disincentive presented by the
prospect of severely limiting the revenues they draw from the un
regulated distribution of their DMV records.58 That pecuniary motiva
tion to ignore or subvert the general privacy and safety interests of the
people suffices to tip the balance in favor of federal regulation.59
Therefore, while both the federal and state governments are compe
tent to regulate the distribution of DMV records, the states may lack
the regulatory motivation necessary to ensure the protection of na
tional safety and privacy interests.
Because the DPPA is within the federal government's enumerated
power under the Commerce Clause, under the formalistic approach of
Lopez and perhaps under the functional approach advocated by re
cent scholarship, the mode of preemption is proper to federal regula
tion of the distribution of DMV records. Moreover, the law addresses
an issue potentially of national concern, one that the states independ
ently are disinclined to adequately address due to the financial disin
centives posed by limiting the sale of DMV records.
II.

TOEING THE GARCIA LINE: THE TENTH AMENDMENT
IMPLICATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE FORM

Having survived the threshold Commerce Clause inquiry, the
DPPA must also endure the second prong of the constitutionality test
- that is, whether the mode of the law is compatible with the Tenth

58. See, e.g., Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that "because
Wisconsin formerly sold its records for use in creating mailing lists, and for other purposes,
the Act deprives the state of approximately $8 million in annual revenue").
59. See Regan, supra note 19, at 580. Regan argues that "[e]ven if Congress has no ad
vantage in competence, it would still have adequate reason to intervene if the states were
motivated to ignore or subvert the general interest"
It should be noted that a state policy respecting privacy by closing state motor vehicle
records might conceivably have the benefit of attracting more residents to the state and
thereby increasing the state's tax base. The countervailing power of this benefit, however, is
difficult to assess and somewhat farfetched by comparison with the concrete loss of revenues
that would immediately result from the cessation of the sale of DMV records.
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Amendment: The origin of the focus on legislative mode, of primary
concern to the New York and Printz Courts, may be traced to the
Court's earlier decision in Garcia. By doing away with the judicial
cataloguing of "traditional government functions"60 relegated to state
sovereign control, Garcia paved the way for New York's and Printz's
focus on the mode of regulation of the laws under scrutiny.61
The relationship between the Court's decision in Garcia and the
Court's later decisions in New York and Printz is complicated, both by
Garcia's inattention to the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on fed
eral authority and by New York's apparent marginalization of cases in
the Garcia line. First, Garcia proposes that state participation in the
political process is a sufficient limitation on federal overreaching,62
while New York and Printz strongly reassert the role of the Tenth
Amendment in constraining the manner in which the federal govern
ment exercises its constitutional authority.63 Second, and equally vex
ing for the development of a coherent Tenth Amendment jurispru
dence, the New York Court summarily treats the Garcia line of cases

60. The notion that realms of traditional state function were by their nature beyond fed
eral power to regulate was articulated in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), and elaborated in numerous cases thereafter. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981) (listing interference with a
state's "ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func
tions' " as the third prong in a test of an act's validity under the commerce power); United
States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that, although the federal gov
ernment is entitled to remedy drunk driving on a federal enclave, the suspension of drunk
driver's license was beyond federal power because licensing of automobile drivers is a "tradi
tional government function"); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir. 1977)
(holding that regulation of traffic on public roads is not a "traditional government function"
of the state and not immune to federal control).
61. See Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth Amendment After Garcia: Process-Based Proce
dural Protections, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1657, 1666 (1987) (arguing that Garcia is significant
not merely because it declared National League of Cities unworkable, but also, more impor
tantly, because "it calls for the development of new theories of federalism-based limitations
on the commerce power"); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Juris
prudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. er. REV. 341. Rapaczynski argues that the
Garcia Court's reliance on the "national political process" to protect state power from fed
eral incursion establishes a "process-oriented" approach to federalist problems, in which the
political process is subject to judicial correction where it can be shown to have failed. See id.
at 364. Although Rapaczynski acknowledges Garcia's failure to identify how exactly the
national political process works to protect federalist values or what constitutes a defect in
this political process, he nevertheless sees the Garcia approach as a promising alternative to
the rigid notions of "dual sovereignty" that dominated pre- Garcia Tenth Antendment juris
prudence. See id. at 368-69.
62 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-52 (1985). The
Garcia Court notes that the Constitution ensures the influence of the states in the federal
system by giving states control over the electoral qualifications for the legislative branch and
a key role in presidential elections. See id. at 551 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, art. II,§ 1).
63. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992).
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as concerned with laws of general applicability.64 This characterization
of the Garcia line, absent any explanation of its ramifications for fed
eralism, has been a primary source of confusion for courts in consid
ering the DPPA's constitutionality. In short, courts have been uncer
tain about the scope and meaning of Garcia in the wake of New
York.65
Part TI parses the federalism implications of general applicability
by exploring its relation to the legislative modes of commandeering on
the one hand and conditional preemption on the other. Section TI.A
argues that, by shifting the focus of Tenth Amendment inquiry away
from a formalistic cataloguing of traditional government functions,
Garcia in fact set the stage for New York's and Printz's focus on legis
lative mode. Section TI.B offers an explanation grounded in federalist
principles for the New York Court's recognition that the laws at issue
in the Garcia line do not pose the federalist problems entailed by
commandeering. Specifically, Section TI.B argues, through the exam
ple of South Carolina v. Baker, that the federalism implications of
generally applicable laws are illuminated by focusing on the preemp
tive mode in which they tend to operate.
A.

Garcia Set the Stage for New York and Printz

The Court in Garcia held constitutional the provision of the Fair
Labor Standards Act imposing maximum hour/minimum wage re
quirements on state employers, thereby rejecting the blanket prohibi
tion on the regulation of "States as States" established in National
League of Cities.6(, The Garcia Court rejected the traditional govern
ment function test because it offered no coherent basis for identifying
what these most fundamental elements of state sovereignty were.67
Moreover, the Court found that this "traditional function"-finding en
deavor, relying on a rigid, a priori definition of state sovereignty, was
fundamentally incompatible with the dynamic role of federalism in a

64.

See New York, 505 U.S. at 160.

65. See, e.g., Pryor v. Reno, 171F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 1999); Condon v. Reno,
155F.3d 453, 460-63 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999).
66. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845, 852 (1976); see also
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555-557.
67. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538-39. The Garcia Court noted, for example, that under the
"traditional government function" test, courts had been led to designate the licensing of
drivers as within the bounds of state sovereignty, see United States v. Best, 573F.2d 1095,
1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978), while upholding federal regulation of traffic on public roads, see
Friends of Earth v. Carey, 552 F2d 25, 38 (2d Cir. 1977). The Court concluded that "[t]he
constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and regulating traffic . . . is elusive at
best." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 539.
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democratic society.68 The New York and Printz Courts are indebted to
Garcia for taking this radical stance, which propelled Tenth Amend
ment jurisprudence out of the "traditional government function" rut
and hence beyond its unhelpful focus on demarcating the "what" of
state sovereignty as the primary means of precluding federal en
croachment.69 In so doing, Garcia enabled the New York and Printz
Courts to treat how federal regulation functions as a source of impor
tant limitations on the federal government's exercise of its constitu
tional authority under the Tenth Amendment.
The New York and Printz Courts go beyond Garcia in their under
standing of the means by which the principal federalism concerns of
political accountability and prevention of tyranny must be protected.
Presuming the federal political process sufficient to preserve the bal
ance of power between state and federal government, the Garcia
Court concluded that "[s]tate sovereign interests . . . are more prop
erly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of
the federal system than by judicially crafted limitations on federal
power."70 Printz and New York, on the other hand, clearly establish
that, regardless of the political process by which laws are engendered,
federal regulation that operates by commandeering the states violates
the limitations on federal power implicit in the Tenth Amendment.71
Still, New York and Printz were able to construct this new analytical

68. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545-46; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses
and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2212-13, 2228, 2240
(1998) (discussing the tension between principled constitutional adjudication and the de
mands of flexible federalism and arguing for process·based, clear evidence requirements that
focus on the source of federal power and need for federal action); Deborah Jones Merritt,
The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 12-14, 36 (1988) (rejecting National League of Cities' "traditional governmental func
tion" basis for limiting the federal commerce power and arguing that the constitutional
guarantee of a republican form of government produces a more workable concept of feder
alism); Rapaczynski, supra note 61, at 359-68. Rapaczynski, following the Garcia Court, re
jects the language of dual sovereignty employed by the Court and scholars in attempting to
clarify the tension between state and federal power that underpins the federalist structure of
our government. The fiction of a rigid divide is exposed by Garcia's conclusion that process
may be the primary means of identifying appropriate exercises of state and federal power.
Id. at 351-52, 356-57, 359-60. Rapaczynski notes that "the traditional concept of sovereignty
simply obfuscates the fact that actual authority in the modem states resides in an often
shifting configuration of political, economic, and social groups, with the state being only one
of the contenders." Id. at 359 n.50.
69. See Merritt, supra note 68, at 15 (noting the radical character of Garcia); Rapaczyn·
ski, supra note 61, at 372-73. Rapaczynski argues that Garcia's reliance on the political pro·
cess to tend the federalist balance of power does not exclude the imposition of real limita
tions on the federal government's exercise of its legislative authority. . Rather, Garcia's
emphasis on the political process recognizes that substantive limits can only be meaningful if
informed by a complex account of the nature of federalist institutions. Id.
70. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
71. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 188 (1992).

November 1999]

Conditional Preemption

529

framework for Tenth Amendment analysis based on legislative mode
because Garcia razed the "traditional government function" edifice of
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence that had stood in its place.
B.

Federalism Implications of General Applicability

Without challenging the validity of Garcia, the New York Court
sidestepped the Garcia line of cases by identifying them as concerned
with laws of "general applicability," that is, laws that apply to both
states and private parties.72 Although the New York Court uses the
term "laws of general applicability" as a term of art, the phrase used as
such occurs nowhere in Garcia or the cases generally associated with
it. To the degree that the concept is present in cases of the Garcia
line, it is important solely as an indicator that the laws at issue do not
seek to dominate the states in their sovereign relation to their citi
zens.73 Nevertheless, the New York Court stated that the challenge to
the "take-title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act "presents no occasion to apply or revisit the holdings of any of
these cases, as this is not a case in which Congress has subjected a
State to the same legislation applicable to private parties."74 The
Court's distinction between federal laws that apply only to states and
generally applicable laws that apply to both state and private activities,
however, offers only a superficial basis for the constitutionality of a
law under the Tenth Amendment.75
The concern posed by laws that apply to the states but not private
parties is that the federal government may use such legislation to
regulate private parties indirectly without accepting the political and
economic burden such regulation entails.76 This legislative indirection

72 See New York, 505 U.S. at 160. The phrase appears to derive from a line of Free
Exercise cases epitomized by Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. '8:72, '8:77-80 (1990), in
which the Court reviewed the question of whether a facially neutral law (hence, "generally
applicable") is constitutional under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment if a
particular religious group were prejudicially affected by the law.
73. See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554; South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15
(1988); see also infra Section II.B.1.
74. New York, 505 U.S. at 160.
75. See New York, 505 U.S. at 201-02 (White, J., dissenting) (exposing the formalistic
quality of the Court's analysis regarding laws of general applicability). With regard to the
majority's distinction between federal statutes that regulate both states and private parties
and those that regulate only state activity, Justice White asserts that "[i]n no case has the
Court rested its holding on such a distinction." Id. at 201. Finding no support for the ma
jority's suggestion that generally applicable laws per se constitute a lesser incursion on state
sovereignty, Justice White astutely notes that "[t]he alleged diminution in state authority
over its own affairs is not any less because the federal mandate restricts the activities of pri
vate parties [as well]." Id. at 202.
76. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 929-30; New York, 505 U.S. at 167-69. The Printz Court de
scribes the federalist concerns raised by commandeering as follows:
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poses a serious threat to the federalist principle of prevention of tyr
anny through political accountability.77 Problems of accountability
arise if voters mistakenly hold state officers responsible for actions
those officers were forced to take under federal law, or if voters fail to
hold the federal government responsible for imposing certain choices
and costs on the states.78 Moreover, federal lawmakers will hold them
selves less responsible to voters if they find ways to direct states to
carry out federally prescribed programs.79 A federal law that seeks to
impose the same constraints on both states and private parties is by
definition not an instance of the federal government evading direct
regulation of private conduct, and so it does not pose this threat to
federalist values associated with commandeering.80 In short, general
applicability is one indication that a law does not interfere with the
balance of state and federal power in this way.81
This notion of general applicability may also be a throwback to the
ultimately unworkable "traditional government function" test pro
pounded by National League of Cities and rejected by Garcia.152 To the
degree that a statute is designed to regulate the activity of both states

By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal
regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without
having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. And even
when the States are not forced to absorb the costs . . . they are still put in the position of
taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 930.

77. See Jackson, supra note 68, at 2200-05; Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1573-74 {1994).
78. See Jackson, supra note 68, at 2201.
79. See id.
80. This is not to say that laws of general applicability, which operate predominantly in a
preemptive mode, see infra Section II.B.1, are entirely free from accountability confusion.
As Jackson notes, a certain level of confusion regarding public accountability inheres in the
federalist structure established by the Constitution: "[A] federal system necessarily results
in a more confusing situation for voters than does a unitary, centralized government. Stan
dard preemption - the effect of federal law in negating the area in which state Jaw can op
erate
can obscure the causes of inaction by state officials." Jackson, supra note 68, at
2201-02 {footnote omitted).
-

It should be noted that conditional preemption in some sense reduces this problem, in
that it allows states to choose between implementation of federal standards and preemption
in a field in which state activity affects the national welfare, a choice for which state citizens
may justly hold the state, rather than the federal government, accountable.
81. See Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 163 F.3d 1000 {7th
("[T]he purpose of drawing a distinction between laws of general applicability and
laws directed exclusively at states is not to suggest that the former are always constitutional
and the latter are always unconstitutional . . . . Rather, the distinction is one indication how
much a congressional enactment upsets tile structural balance between federal and state
sovereignty, if at all.").
Cir. 1998)

82 See supra notes 29, 67-68 and accompanying text; Jackson, supra note 68, at 22rt7.
tllere is no doubt tllat tile Printz Court remained mired to some ex
tent in an arguably outdated "separate spheres" model of dual sovereignty. See id. at 2206.

As Jackson points out,
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and private individuals, it is less likely to be encroaching on an area of
uniquely governmental function, as such functions will tend to be car
ried out by states rather than individuals.83 The fact that an activity is
carried out only by the states, however, is but one indicator that it may
not fall within reach of federal regulatory power; that indicator is not
in itself sufficient to render federal regulation of that activity per se
unconstitutional.
Because of the New York Court's failure to explain why generally
applicable laws do not pose federalism problems, the Court's passing
identification of the laws at issue in the Garcia line of cases as such has
proven confusing to courts in evaluating the DPPA. For example, the
Fourth Circuit, in Condon v. Reno, affirmed the lower court holding
that the DPPA was unconstitutional on the grounds that it is not a law
that applies equally to states and individuals.84 The Fourth Circuit ap
parently concluded, from New York's and Printz's characterizations of
the Garcia line of cases as concerned with laws of general applicabil
ity, that federal laws regulating states as states would only be permis
sible under the Tenth Amendment if they applied to both state and
private parties. This reasoning is formalistic in that it fails to take ac
count of the basis on which generally applicable laws are deemed to
preserve federalist values.
The mere fact that the DPPA does not take the form of a law of
general applicability does not conclude the inquiry info its constitu
tionality. For the same reasons that generally applicable laws tend to
be unproblematic for federalism, laws taking the form of conditional
preemption are equally so. New York and Printz distinguish permissi
ble conditional preemption from impermissible commandeering with
out making explicit the analytical connection between generally appli
cable laws and preemptive ones.85
After articulating its anti
commandeering rule, the New York Court simply asserts that "[t]he
Constitution instead gives Congress the authority to regulate matters
directly and to pre-empt contrary state regulation."86 This distinction
between commandeering and preemption cuts closer to the quick of
the federalist problem of separating efficacious exercises of federal
authority that do not compromise federalist values, from federal over
reaching that undermines a state's ability to be politically responsible
to its citizens.
Section II.B.1 examines South Carolina v. Baker as an instance of a
case in the Garcia line that, in addition to fitting the descriptive cate
gory of general applicability, operates through the mode of condi-

83. See Jackson, supra note 68, at 2207.
84. 155 F.3d 453, 463 (4th Cir. 1998).
85. See Hills, supra note 36, at 921.
86. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992).
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tional preemption. Section II.B.2 argues that the mode of conditional
preemption encompasses all laws that offer the states a genuine choice
between abandoning a regulatory field and implementing federal re
quirements, regardless of whether the field involves regulation of pri
vate as well as state activity.
1.

From General Applicability to Conditional Preemption:

South Carolina v. Baker
Although the New York Court explicitly stated that the Garcia line
of cases should be applied in evaluating "laws of general applicabil
ity," there is no indicator that these are the only cases to which the
earlier line of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence should apply.87 Nei
ther Garcia itself, nor Baker which followed and elaborated upon it,
grounds the decision to uphold federal law in the identification of the
law as a "law of general applicability."88 The New York Court's retro
spective identification of the laws treated by the Garcia line of cases as
"generally applicable" is descriptively accurate; yet, it should not be
misconstrued as providing the legal underpinning or the limiting prin
ciple on which these decisions were based.89
The law at issue in Garcia, correctly described by the New York
Court as a law of general applicability, is more precisely characterized
for federalism purposes as a law operating in the legislative mode of
preemption. The conditions for preemption exist when the state and
federal governments have concurrent power \vithin a particular field
of regulation.90 In Garcia, the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority argued that control of mass-transit was a traditional state
function, hence within state control;91 at the same time, prior Court
decisions had extended the federal government's commerce power to
intrastate activities, like the creation of a mass-transit system, that af
fect interstate commerce.92 Hence, the prerequisite concurrent state
and federal power was present, making preemption viable.

87. See New York, 505 U.S. at 177-78.
88. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 {1985); South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 {1988).
89. See William A. Hazeltine, New York v. United States: A New Restriction on Con·
gressional Power Vis-a-Vis the States, 55 Omo ST. LJ. Z37, 250-51 (1994) (arguing that the
New York Court failed to adequately address prior Supreme Court precedent as embodied
in the Garcia line of cases).
90. See Gardbaum, supra note 37, at 770.
91. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530-31; Brief of San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author·
ity, Garcia (No. 82-1913), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs file.
92 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc. 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 {1981), for this proposition).
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Preemption doctrine dictates that where federal and state laws
conflict in.a field of concurrent power, federal law will prevail.93 More
broadly, preemption doctrine allows that, even absent a contrary state
law, the federal government may take regulatory possession of the
field by passing legislation that makes manifest this intent.94 The un
doubted constitutionality of the legislative mode of preemption has
been grounded most frequently in the Supremacy Clause, and, less
commonly, in the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution.95
In other words, the mode of preemption is constitutional by virtue not
only of the preeminence of federal law in areas of legitimate federal
control, but also of the existence of a national interest that requires
that a given field be uniformly regulated according to a single set of
rules.96 Setting standards for employee working conditions - for ex
ample, environmental regulation - is a field of this kind in which pre
emption is appropriate.97
Section 310 of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") at issue in
South Carolina v. Baker, also generally applicable to both state and
private enterprises,98 differs from the law at issue in Garcia in that it
operates in a conditionally preemptive mode. The provision of IRC
section 310 that was challenged in the case barred ("preempted") the
state issuance of unregistered ("bearer") bonds, but allowed the state
to continue to issue bonds in compliance with federal registration re
quirements.99 The national concern the law sought to address was the
use of unregistered bonds as an instrument of tax evasion. 100 That
concern was of self-evident national importance101 and probably would
have justified complete federal preemption of the field. By making
federal occupation of the bond-issuing field conditional on the state's
decision not to implement federal requirements, the law departed
from standard preemption. The challenged provision was upheld,
however, on the grounds that it intervened directly in a state activity
rather than commandeering the states to regulate a private activity ac
cording to a federal regulatory scheme.102 In other words, it gave the

93. See Gardbaum, supra note 37, at 770.
94. See id. at 771-72.
95. See id. at 773-74, 781-83.
96. See id. at 781.
97. See Hills, supra note 36, at 921.
98. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 510 (1988).
99. See id. at 511.
100. See id. at 508-09 (stating that Internal Revenue Service studies indicated that unre
ported income had grown from an estinlated range of $31.1 billion to $32.2 billion in 1973 to
a range of $93.3 billion to $97 billion in 1981).
101. See id.
102 See id. at 514.
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states a choice between preemption in the field of issuing bonds and
continuing to be active in the field by bringing its issuing standards
into compliance with federal registration requirements.
The Baker Court relied and elaborated upon Garcia's approach to
federalist problems, recognizing that compliance with federal preemp
tion did not present the difficulties posed by federal commandeering
of the states.103 The Court based its analysis on an assessment of the
IRC's objectives as well as the mode in which it sought to accomplish
them. The Court found that the IRC's regulation of state issuance of
bonds did not violate federalist principles; the regulation did not seek
to control the manner in which the states regulate private parties, and
hence did not unduly interfere with political accountability or the po
litical responsiveness of local government to the popular voice.104
Rather, the Court recognized that any federal regulation demands
5
compliance, which may be mischaracterized as "commandeering."10
The Baker Court, taking its cues from Garcia, sought to hammer
out a more analytical approach to assessing the federalist concerns
presented by federal regulation of state activities. Notably, both the
New York and Printz decisions recognize preemption of the kind at
issue in Baker as a valid exercise of federal power.106

2

Understanding the Limits of Conditional Preemption:
New York v. United States

As already noted, it is possible to reconcile the Garcia line of cases
with New York and Printz by recognizing the Garcia line as concerned
not simply with "laws of general applicability" but, more fundamen
tally, with federal laws that preempt contrary state laws. The New
York Court's assertion that Congress has the power to preempt state
law implies a recognition of the constitutionality of federal laws that
offer states a choice between preemption in a given field and continu
ing to regulate in accordance with federal requirements. Printz makes
this explicit. 107 In recognition of the permissibility of conditional pre
emption, the Printz Court cited Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v.
Mississippi ("FERC") as cases that justifiably upheld federal laws be
cause compliance with federal standards under these laws was merely
"a precondition to continued state regulation of an otherwise pre-

103. See id. at 514-15.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 514.
106. See United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 925-27 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992).
107. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-27.
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empted field."108 This distinction between commandeering and condi
tional preemption is central to evaluating the scope of the anti
commandeering principle established in New York and Printz.109
Some courts have read too narrowly New York's exemption of
preemption from its anti-commandeering imperative and, as a result,
have understood that exemption as applying exclusively to laws that
preempt state regulation of private parties.11° This error derives from a
misreading of the New York Court's statement that "where Congress
has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce
Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice
of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having
state law pre-empted by federal regulation."111 Although this pro
nouncement is concerned with laws that regulate private parties, it
does not suggest, as some courts have inferred,112 that federal preemp
tion of state law is only permissible with regard to regulation of pri
vate activity.113 In fact, that reading is directly at odds with the Court's
earlier holding in Baker.114
In Baker, the Court specifically upheld the Internal Revenue Code
provision that essentially prohibited states from continuing to issue
unregistered bonds on the grounds that "[s]ection 310 regulates state
activities; it does not . . . seek to control or influence the manner in

108. See id. at 925-26.
109. See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, New York, Printz and Yeskey: The New
Etiquette of Federalism, 1998 SUP. Cr. REV. 71, 82-83; Hills, supra note 36, at 917 (arguing
that generally applicable laws should be exempted from the per se anti-commandeering rule
of New York "not because they apply to private persons as well as nonfederal officials, but
rather because such laws typically have the form of conditional preemption").
110. See, e.g., Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 463 n.6 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S.
Ct. 1753 (1999) (citing New York for the proposition that only where Congress has the
power to regulate private parties may it impose laws that take on the form of conditional
preemption).
111. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167.
112 See, e.g., Condon, 155 F3d at 463 n.6 ("The dissent contends that the DPP A is con
stitutional because Congress could have 'preempted the field of motor vehicle information
disclosure.' We disagree. Only 'where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity
under the Commerce aa:use . . . [may it] offer States the choice of regulating that activity
according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.' "(in
ternal reference omitted) (first emphasis added)).
113. See Oklahoma ex reL Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 161 F3d
1266, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The Supreme Court has never suggested that the Tenth
Amendment bars Congress from regulating state conduct merely because states are the only
actors engaged in certain activity.'').
114. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1005-06 (7th Cir. 1998). The Travis Court
locates Condon's overly narrow reading of New York in the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that
Congress may regulate the states only through laws of general applicability, drawn from New
York's observation that most recent Tenth Amendment cases have dealt with such laws. See
id at 1006 ("Once again the word 'only' comes from the Fourth Circuit rather than the
Supreme Court.").
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which States regulate private parties."115 According to Baker, then, a
federal law presenting states with a choice between preemption of a
state activity (issuing bonds) and continuation of that activity in com
pliance with federal guidelines is entirely constitutional where the con
sequences of the state activity fall within Congress's enumerated pow
ers.116 In order for New York to be consistent with past Supreme
Court precedent, its preemption exception cannot be understood as
applying only to federal laws that directly regulate private activities.117
Because New York and Printz acknowledge the validity of laws
operating in a preemptive mode as well as laws of general
applicability, these decisions are consistent with such cases of the
Garcia line as Baker. Conditional preemption respects the federalist
concern for protecting political accountability and responsiveness,
while enabling the federal government to intervene where necessary
to accomplish a public good within its enumerated powers.U8 This
kind of flexibility within the federalist structure of our government
was deemed essential by Garcia.U9 New York and Printz simply
constrain that flexibility by identifying commandeering as a mode of
federal legislation that is inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment.
These Courts relied on Garcia in shifting the focus of Tenth

11S. South Carolina v. Baker, 48S U.S. SOS, S14 {1988). Section 310 of the IRC actually
imposed a tax on income from state and local unregistered bonds. The Baker court assumed
that this tax essentially prohibited states from issuing unregistered bonds by making them
undesirable. See id. at S11.
116. See id. at S26 {finding that a tax like that imposed by IRC section 310 on interest
earned by holders of unregistered bonds in order to effectively prohibit issuance of such
bonds, was within the federal government's constitutional taxing power). That the choice to
comply with federal guidelines might require substantial effort on the part of state legislators
and executives did not trouble the Baker court: "Such 'commandeering' is
an inevitable
consequence of regulating a state activity." Id. at S14.
• . .

117. The dissenting judge in the Fourth Circuit's Condon decision, supporting the lower
court's finding that the DPPA was unconstitutional, relies on this argument in attempting to
reconcile the Garcia line of cases with the Supreme Court's decisions in New York and
Printz. See Condon, lSS F.3d at 468 {Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge Phillips asserts that "the
legislation at issue in Garcia and Wyoming
was immune to Tenth Amendment challenge
not so much - if at all - because they applied equally to state and private actors as because
they directly regulated state activities rather than using the 'States as implements of regula
tion' of third parties." Id.
. • .

118. The New York Court recognized conditional preemption as a mode of federal
regulation that, by presenting states with a choice, could preserve the federalist values of
political accountability and responsiveness:
If state residents would prefer their government to devote its attention and resources to
problems other than those deemed important by Congress, they may choose to have the
Federal Government rather than the State bear the expense of a federally mandated regula
tory program, and they may continue to supplement that program to the extent state law is
not pre-empted.
New York, SOS U.S. at 168.
119. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at S4S-46.
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Amendment analysis beyond the particular activity regulated and
towards the manner of regulation.
ill. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DPPA:
DISTINGUISHING PERMISSIBLE PREEMPTION
FROM IMPERMISSIBLE COMMANDEERING

The New York and Printz Courts recognized the constitutionality
of federal preemption of state law, thereby affirming the distinction
between preemption and impermissible federal commandeering of the
states.120 Both Courts reiterated the constitutional viability of federal
laws of the former kind, while holding that the laws of the latter type
are inherently incompatible with the fundamental principles of feder
alism.121 Section III.A argues that the DPPA is constitutional because,
unlike the laws at issue in Printz and New York, it exemplifies condi
tional preemption rather than commandeering. Section III.B com
pares the DPPA to other laws that the Court has held constitutional in
several cases in the Garcia line and that present less compelling in
stances of conditional preemption than the DPPA.
A.

The DPPA Takes the Constitutionally Permissible Form of
Conditional Preemption

The courts that have failed to recognize the DPPA as an instance
of conditional preemption have accordingly not recognized that the
law falls outside the anti-commandeering rule established in Printz
and New York. The two circuit courts that have held the DPPA un
constitutional have objected to the benefit the federal government
would wring from the states by requiring them to train their own
DMV employees to distinguish valid from invalid requests for per-

120. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-26 ("In Hodel we . . . concluded that the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 did not present the problem . . . raised [by comman
deering] because it merely made compliance with federal standards a precondition to con
tinued state regulation in an otherwise pre-empted field"); New York, 505 U.S. at 160 ("Peti
tioners
do not dispute that under the Supremacy Clause Congress could, if it wished, pre
empt state radioactive waste regulation. Petitioners contend only that the Tenth Amend
ment limits the power of Congress to regulate in the way it has chosen.")
. . •

121. See, e.g., ; Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-26 ("In Hodel we . . . concluded that the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 did not present the problem . . . raised [by
commandeering] because it merely made compliance with federal standards a precondition
to continued state regulation in an otherwise pre-empted field."); New York, 505 U.S. at 178
("No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not
give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate. The Constitution instead gives
Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and to pre-empt contrary state regula
tion.").
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sonal information under the DPPA requirements.122 Only one circuit
court and one district court that have considered the law have recog
nized that the Act offers states the alternative of pulling out of the
field entirely by simply closing their records to the public.123 While
recognizing the preemption alternative afforded by the DPPA, the dis
trict court nevertheless dismissed it as insufficient to address the ac
countability concerns at the heart of the anti-commandeering rule.124
Laws taking the form of conditional preemption are generally
deemed constitutional because they allow the federal government to
regulate in areas of particularly national concern without violating
fundamental federalist values. Such laws preserve state autonomy by
offering states a choice between continuing to regulate in a particular
field in accordance with federally prescribed standards or abandoning
the field entirely to direct federal control.125 This basic characteristic
of choice is more than a formal quality of conditional preemption.
The distinction offered in Printz between permissible federal laws
that apply incidentally to the states and impermissible federal laws
whose "whole object [is] to direct the functioning of the state execu
tive" is consistent with the view of commandeering as something more
than mere compliance.126 The federal government is guilty of imper
missible commandeering when it could accomplish its particular goal
by directly regulating the behavior of private parties but instead
chooses to achieve its ends by ordering the states to constrain their
citizens in a particular way. In such a case, the problem of political ac
countability is obvious, in that the federal government shirks direct
imposition on private parties and instead seeks through its legislation
to conscript the states into doing its dirty work. Because DMVs are a
primary site for the accumulation of personal information about a
state's citizens and because individuals are generally not engaged in
collecting such information on a state-wide basis, however, the federal
government cannot regulate the national market in DMV records by

122. See, e.g., Pryor v. Reno, 171 F3d 1281, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1999); Condon, 155 F.3d
at 460.
123. See Oklahoma ex reL Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 161 F.3d
1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998) ("If states do not wish to comply with those regulations, they may
stop disseminating information in their motor vehicle records to the public."); Travis v.
Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 163 F3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998).
124. See Travis, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 928. The court objects to the DPPA's preemption al
ternative for failing to deflect accountability from the states: "That states may avoid obliga
tions imposed by the act by 'choosing' to close their motor vehicle records to the public en
tirely does not avoid this problem because States, not the federal government, will remain
accountable to their citizens for such a decision." Id. It is not clear, however, why the state
should not be held accountable for the decision to allow its regulatory power to be pre
empted instead of choosing to regulate in accordance with federal requirements.
125. See Hills, supra note 36, at 926-27.
126. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (emphasis removed).
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directly regulating private parties.127
Therefore, the most direct
method of accomplishing the DPPA's objective is to target state activ
ity.

Unlike the DPPA, the laws at issue in New York and Printz
impermissibly sought to dictate the states' regulation of private parties
rather than directly regulate state activity or private behavior or
both.128 The "take-title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act under examination in New York interfered with the
states' relation to private citizens by requiring the state to take title to
the waste produced by in-state private waste producers. The New
York Court recognized Congress's right to regulate the conduct of pri
vate waste producers directly but objected to the mode of regulation
chosen here because it impermissibly commandeered the states to
regulate private citizens in a federally prescribed manner.129 Similarly,
in Printz, the challenged provision of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act sought to dictate the relation between the state and its
citizens by requiring state officers to conduct background checks on
prospective handgun purchasers.130 The DPPA, by contrast, accom
plishes federal objectives by operating directly on the relevant state
activity rather than seeking to reach the conduct of individuals by ma
nipulating the states' relation to their citizens.
In exempting laws of general applicability from the prohibition on
commandeering, the Printz and New York Courts focused on prohib
iting only congressional legislation that accomplishes indirectly an
objective that the federal government could as easily accomplish di
rectly. This is not to suggest, however, that the only federal laws that
do not threaten federalist principles are generally applicable laws.131
127. See Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety ("ODPS"), 161 F3d at 1271. The ODPS court
cites with approval Judge Phillips's dissenting opinion in Condon, stating that "it is no basis
for invalidating [the DPPA] . . . that no private equivalent could be found in the particular
area of regulation." Id. (citing Condon, 155 F.3d at 469 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The ODPS court further asserts that "[t]he Supreme Court has
never suggested that the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from regulating state conduct
merely because states are the only actors engaged in certain activity." Id.
128. See Travis, 163 F3d at 1004 ("[T]he basic distinction between cases such as [Baker]
and cases such as New York is that states and privates parties may be the objects of regula
tion, although states cannot be compelled to become regulators of private conduct.").
129. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992); see also Condon, 155
F.3d at 466 (Phillips, J., dissenting) ("[T]he end object of the [DPPA] . . . is not the indirect
regulation of private conduct - here information use - by forcing the states directly to
regulate that conduct, in the way that the states were held impermissibly compelled to regu
late the waste-handling conduct of private parties in New York v. United States."). But see
Richard D. Weiner, New York v. United States: Federalism and the Disposal of Low-Level
Radioactive Waste, 34 NAT. REsOURCES J. 197, 216-17 (1994). Weiner is skeptical of this
reading of New York. He argues that the Court's failure to define the phrase "regulatory
program" leaves an impermissibly wide range of federal statutes open to challenge. See id.
130.

See Printz, 521 U.S. at 929-31.

131.

See supra Section II.B.
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Where a federal law seeks to achieve a nationally important objective
that falls within the government's enumerated powers and can do so
only by regulating states as states, the law cannot be characterized as
commandeering.132 In such a case, the object of the law is not to com
mandeer the states; rather, the law overrides state policy with the ob
ject of protecting a national interest that falls under the federal gov
ernment's power to regulate.133 Moreover, state compliance with a
demand for federal access to such state information is recognized by
Printz and New York as probably too de minimus to qualify as com
mandeering of the kind these cases prohibit.134 Hence, it seems likely
that implementation of the DPPA would be within the federal gov
ernment's institutional capacity.
Although the DPPA fails to articulate a precise federal regulatory
mechanism for the distribution of DMV information should states
choose to abandon the field entirely by closing their DMV records, it
does not misuse preemption as merely an empty threat.135 The fact
that a federal law preempting state law fails to specify a regulatory al
ternative is not in itself sufficient to render the law unconstitutional.136
The preemption alternative offered by the DPPA is valid because it
simply is not a threat but a viable solution to the problem the law is
designed to address.137 In this respect, it resembles the prohibition on
state issuance of unregistered bonds offered by IRC section 301 and is
distinguishable from PURPA's exemption alternative that did nothing
to address the national energy crisis.138
132

See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 515 (1988).

133. The standard for determining what constitutes a "national interest" is not alto
gether clear. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. While Section I.B suggests that
regulation of the distribution of private DMV information might be such an interest, resolu
tion of the standard for determining what constitutes a "national interest" is beyond the
scope of this Note.
134.

See Printz, 521 U.S. at 937 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

135. A better drafted DPPA might give some outline of the federal regulatory scheme
that the government intends to implement should States choose preemption over continued
regulation in accordance with federal regulations. Even where Congress fails to provide an
explicit alternative regulatory mechanism to replace the preempted state regulatory scheme,
however, it nevertheless acts within its preemption power. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 766 (1982).
136.

See id.

137. See Hills, supra note 36, at 925 ("[I]f the only purpose of preemption of state or
local policy is simply to pressure state or local governments into enacting regulations ac
cording to federal standards, then the preemption would be just as unconstitutional as an
outright demand for the regulatory services.").
138. See id. at 924-26. Hills objects to the FERC Court's failure to consider the question
whether the preemption provision of PURPA was related to achieving the law's stated pur
pose:
[The Court's] reasoning does not explain how the implicit threat of preemption has any
nexus to the goal of insuring that utilities implement federal energy-saving standards. After
all, unless unregulated utilities are somehow more inclined toward conservation of energy
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Conditional Preemption as Exemplified in FERC v. Mississippi
and South Carolina v. Baker Assists in Assessing the DPPA

A look at the Supreme Court's use of preemption analysis in
upholding other federal regulatory laws highlights the validity of the
DPPA. Under the DPPA, states have options similar to those upheld
in Baker and options less coercive than those upheld in FERC v.
Mississippi.
In FERC, the Court upheld a provision of the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA"), relying on preemption analysis
to justify its decision.139 The federal law at issue in FERC required
state regulatory authorities and nonregulated utilities to consider im
plementing federal regulatory standards to combat a nationwide en
ergy crisis resulting from utilities' unregulated use of natural gas and
oil in the generation of electricity.140 It also gave the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission the separate power to exempt energy pro
ducers entirely from state regulation.141 The Supreme Court found
that occupying the field of public utility regulation in a time of na
tional energy crisis was a constitutional exercise of federal preemptive
power.142
The FERC Court held the challenged provisions of PURPA
constitutional on the grounds that they operated in the permissible
mode of conditional preemption.143 The Court analogized PURPA to
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act upheld in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass 'n, Inc. that gave states the
option of either regulating strip mining in compliance with federal

than regulated utilities, the preemption of utility regulation does nothing to advance, and
might even impede, PURPA's purpose.
Id. at 926.

139. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 742.
140. See id. at 745-46.
141. See id. at 759.
142 See id. at 745, 763-64. It is worth noting that the Court appears to limit its recogni
tion of the federal government's power to preempt regulation of utilities by specifying pri
vate actors: "Congress could have pre-empted the field, at least insofar as private rather
than state activity is concerned . . ." Id at 765. The Court's apparent reservation of the
question of whether the same regulation was equally unproblematic as applied to state ac
tivity must be understood in light of the jurisprudential environment in which FERC was
decided. At the time of the decision, National League of Cities, which forbade federal regu
lation of states "as states" in areas of "traditional state functions," was still good law. It
seems likely that, had FERC been decided after Garcia overturned National League of Cit
ies, the Court would not have equivocated on the question whether a federal law regulating
state as well as private activity in a field of self-evident national concern could be deemed a
valid exercise of Congress's preemption power.
.

143. See id. at 768 n.30 {describing PURPA as "a scheme that gives the States a choice
between regulating in conformity with federal requirements, or abandoning regulation in a
given field").
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environmental protection standards or abandoning the field to the
Secretary of the Interior who was charged with implementing a federal
program.144 The Court found that in the field of energy regulation, as
in the field of strip mining regulation, "the Federal Government could
have pre-empted all. . . regulations; instead, it allowed the States to
enter the field if they promulgated regulations consistent with federal
standards."145 The Court adjudged PURPA unproblematic for Tenth
Amendment purposes because the law operated by conditional
preemption, giving states a choice while legitimately seeking to protect
a national interest.146
PURPA is a less compelling instance of conditional preemption
than the DPPA, however, in that the choice PURPA offers the states
is less genuine and, so, more coercive. Because the law fails to provide
the possibility of federal regulation of energy producers as an alterna
tive in the event of state default, the broad preemption power that the
law grants the FERC acts as a federal threat of complete deregulation
should states refuse to consider federal regulatory standards.147 As
such, the preemption provision may act to coerce states into imple
menting federal standards rather than providing them with a bona fide
choice, since deregulation could in no sense ameliorate the national
energy crisis.148 In this respect, PURPA differs significantly from the
DPPA. Federal preemption of the field of DMV record distribution
by closing state DMV records to the public would clearly address the
privacy and safety concerns that motivated the DPPA by keeping the
personal information contained in DMV records out of the interstate
marketplace. The DPPA's preemption alternative, then, unlike the
preemption alternative provided by PURPA, offers a bona fide means
of addressing the concern the law was designed to remedy.

144. See id. at 764-65 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288-290).
145.

FERC, 456 U.S. at 764.

146. See id.

at 769-70 & n.33.

147. See Merritt, supra

note 68, at 64-65. According to Merritt, "PURPA
required
the states either to consider the proposed federal standards or to abandon all regulation of
their electric utilities. . . . The 'choice' embodied in PURPA, therefore, was illusory." Id. at
65 (footnote omitted).
•

•

.

148. See Hills supra note 36, at 921-27. Hills argues that certain "conditions" associated
with preemption may be unconstitutional, adding a further constraint to the federal govern
ment's use of conditional preemption to exercise control over certain state-regulated fields.
Hills sketches a judicial approach to preemption that might identify instances of misuse,
"prohibit[ing] conditional preemption of state or local policies whenever (1) the condition
that the nonfederal government must meet would, if imposed unconditionally, be unconsti
tutional, and (2) Congress threatened preemption of nonfederal policy merely to gain lever
age to extract compliance with the condition." Id. at 924. The challenged provisions of
PURPA were of the latter kind.
,
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The provision of the Internal Revenue Code at issue in South
Carolina v. Baker resembles the DPPA in that it does not have the co
ercive potential of PURPA but rather presents the states with a
genuine choice. The provisions of the IRC at issue in Baker had as
their objective the elimination of "unregistered bonds" that had be
come an instrument of tax evasion.149 The Court found that because
the issuance of such bonds was of national concern, the federal gov
ernment was justified in requiring states to eliminate the undesirable
effects of that activity either by turning over the regulatory field to the
federal government or complying with federal registration require
ments.150 Like the DPPA, then, IRC section 301 was a valid exercise
of the federal government's power of conditional preemption in an
area of national concern.
Nevertheless, the alternatives presented by IRC section 301 and
the DPPA - withdrawal from the field or continued regulation in
compliance with federal standards - necessarily demand some legisla
tive cooperation from the states, in the form of amendments to or re
peal of existing laws.151 The Baker Court saw no coercion or comman
deering implicit in the demand for state cooperation.
Rather,
recognizing that "[a]ny federal regulation demands compliance," the
Baker Court found no constitutional defect in the fact that "a State
wishing to engage in certain activity must take administrative and
sometimes legislative action to comply with federal standards regu
2
lating that activity."15
CONCLUSION

The DPPA, then, is a constitutional instance of the federal gov
ernment's use of conditional preemption to achieve an interest of na
tional importance that the separate states are not motivated to achieve
independently. By giving states a choice between adopting federal re
strictions and withdrawing from the field of regulating DMV informa
tion distribution entirely, the federal government is in no sense coerc
ing the states into implementing federal regulations. For that reason,
the DPPA poses none of the political accountability problems pre
sented by laws that commandeer the states. At most, the DPPA al
lows the federal government to clear the way for federal regulation in
this domain wherever a state chooses preemption over implementa
tion of federal requirements. Closing state DMV records to the public

149. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 509 {1988).
150. See id. at 508-09, 514-15; see also Hills, supra note 36, at 918-21.
151. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1003-04 {7th Cir. 1998) (relying on Baker in up
holding the DPPA).
152 Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15.
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is a reasonable means of controlling the problem of unregulated dis
tribution of personal information. The DPPA is, therefore, a constitu
tional exercise of the federal commerce power in that it does not vio
late basic federalist principles of political accountability and
responsiveness, but rather operates in the permissible mode of condi
tional preemption to regulate a domain properly within federal con
trol.

